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ABSTRACT
Critics of carbon mitigation often appeal to what Jonathan Glover has called 
‘the argument from no difference’: that is, ‘if I don’t do it, someone else will’. 
Yet even if this justifies continued high emissions by the industrialised coun-
tries, it cannot excuse business as usual. The North’s emissions might not harm 
the victims of climate change in the sense of making them worse off than they 
would otherwise be. Nevertheless, it receives benefits produced at the latter’s 
expense. This enrichment is unjust; unjustly-enriched agents ought to make 
compensation. The best form of compensation is vigorous action against cli-
mate change.
KEYWORDS
Climate change, carbon leakage, consequentialism, over-determination
If an aluminium smelter closes in the UK and opens in another country that 
is not going to make a huge difference to the world of climate change but it is 
going to make a huge difference to the area where the jobs are being lost be-
cause the company has moved.
– British Chancellor George Osborne, September 2013.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of curbs on carbon emissions often argue that they will simply prompt a 
rise in other countries’ emissions, cancelling out any benefits. Warnings about 
1. Quoted in Elliott, Thomson and Sylvester (2013).
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‘carbon leakage’ played a prominent role in the US Senate’s opposition to 
the Kyoto Protocol (Davidson, 2008: 75-77; Eckersley, 2010). Senator Frank 
Murkowski wrote that production would shift to the industrialising countries, 
and that ‘even a modest increase in greenhouse gas emissions per capita in 
those countries will negate any sort of action taken elsewhere under the Kyoto 
Protocol or similar agreement’ (2000: 358). ‘We won’t even get reduced car-
bon emissions’, argued Senator Wendell H. Ford of Kentucky. ‘That’s because 
every ton of reduced emissions in the United States and other developed na-
tions will be made up – and then some – in the developing world’ (quoted in 
Davidson, 2008: 77). 
The Kyoto Protocol was deeply flawed, as many, even among its support-
ers, agree. Yet the Senate proposed nothing substantial in its place. Kyoto’s 
critics often seemed to assume that the treaty’s faults justified Washington in 
doing next to nothing.2 The arguments resurfaced before the Copenhagen cli-
mate change summit of 2009. ‘Mr Obama’, advised the Wall Street Journal, 
‘can opt to impose a huge carbon tax and drive jobs overseas, or he can im-
pose the tax along with a tariff, and kick off a trade war. Better to call the 
whole thing off’ (2009c). Two years later British chancellor George Osborne 
remarked that ‘We are not going to save the planet by shutting down our steel 
mills, aluminium smelters and paper manufacturers. All we will be doing is 
exporting valuable jobs out of Britain’ (quoted in Harvey, 2011).
Most philosophers – and many policymakers – agree that the world should 
be doing more to prevent climate change, and that the rich industrialized coun-
tries should bear most of the burden (Baer, 2011: 326; Gardiner, 2011: 29 n.22). 
Many of their opponents doubt that anthropogenic global warming is occurring 
at all – or that its effects will be bad enough to justify taking action. But they 
have also warned that mandatory reductions in the North will cause emissions 
to migrate to Southern countries whose industry is less efficient (Murkowski, 
2000: 353; Coon, 2001). The Wall Street Journal claimed that ‘A cap-and-
tax plan would be the greatest outsourcing boon in history’, and might ‘even 
increase CO2 emissions overall, because the developing nations where busi-
nesses are likely to relocate … tend to use energy less efficiently than does the 
U.S.’ (2009a). The argument, then, is that even if emissions-cuts are desirable, 
it is pointless to act unless the South does as well.
Presented as an excuse for business as usual, this appeals to what Jonathan 
Glover has called ‘the argument from no difference’: that is to say, ‘if I don’t 
do it, someone else will’ (1975: 172). 3 While American critics warned that 
curbs on emissions could raise costs for carbon-intensive industries, encourag-
2. Murkowski, for example, insisted that ‘any actions to address climate change must be volun-
tary and without substantial economic cost’ (2000: 358).
3. Glover writes that the term also refers to claims that ‘One person makes no difference’, such 
as those made when excusing one’s failure to vote. This seems a distinction without a dif-
ference. Such reasoning likewise appeals to overdetermined consequences—‘Even if I don’t 
vote, enough others will’.
Guest User = username
$REMOTE_ASSR = IP address
Tue, 20 Oct 2015 21:07:47 = Date & Time
CARBON LEAKAGE AND THE ARGUMENT FROM NO DIFFERENCE
537
Environmental Values 24.4
ing them to migrate, this is not the only way that carbon leakage could occur. 
By consuming fewer fossil fuels, the North might cause their prices to fall, en-
couraging more consumption elsewhere. Deep cuts could also reduce the felt 
urgency of the threat posed by climate change, encouraging other states to free-
ride off the North’s efforts (Posner and Weisbach, 2010: 81; Pearson, 2011: 
150–51, 181). Indeed, much of the rise in emissions from China, and other 
industrialising countries, results from producing goods for export to the indus-
trialised world (Goldenberg, 2014), although this shift can occur for different 
reasons, such as industries migrating to take advantage of cheaper labour and 
other favourable conditions (Eckersley, 2010: 371).
This paper makes two assumptions: that the world ought to be doing more 
about climate change, and that without a binding global-emissions regime, any 
cuts by the North will be cancelled out by carbon leakage to the South. In real-
ity, the premise that ‘carbon leakage’ will completely offset emissions-cuts is 
dubious. Many studies suggest that only a minority of emissions leak to other 
countries. Moreover, policy can be designed to minimise leakage. Emissions-
curbs could, if necessary, target sources that cannot ‘migrate’, such as cars 
(Davidson, 2008: 77; Eckersley, 2010: 376-78; Pearson, 2011: 151–56).4 
Nevertheless, it is worth examining what it would mean if the premise were 
true. Glover notes that any number of seemingly odious acts – from develop-
ing chemical weapons to dealing heroin – could be defended by claiming that 
‘if I don’t do it, someone else will’. This argument may cut no ice with deon-
tologists. If rights take the form of ‘side constraints’, and may not be violated 
even in order to bring about outcomes that are better, or fairer (Nozick, 1974: 
28–29), then the fact that someone else would have committed the unjust ac-
tion in the agent’s place seems neither here nor there. 
Those who criticise carbon mitigation on the grounds that it would make 
no difference are arguing along consequentialist lines, however, and for con-
sequentialists it is harder to put one’s finger on where it goes wrong. The most 
obvious reason to condemn heroin dealers or chemical-weapons scientists is 
that they harm people. But if others would have done the damage anyway, then 
it is not clear that they do harm people, in the sense of making them worse 
off than they would otherwise be. This conception of harm can be challenged 
(Norcross, 2005). Still, ‘it is hard’, as Glover observes, ‘for those of us who 
think that moral choices between courses of action ought to be determined, 
either largely or entirely, by their different outcomes, to explain what is wrong 
with such a defence’ (1975: 171). 
This paper gives a consequentialist answer. It explores the argument from 
no difference, and finds that the actions which it is invoked to defend typically 
4. Carbon leakage will, moreover, have some desirable effects; on the whole, it will benefit 
poor countries at the expense of rich ones. That carbon leakage will improve the international 
distribution of resources is not an argument in its favour, however, that the US Senate or the 
Wall Street Journal would accept.
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involve unjust enrichment. Agents may engage in harmful practices without 
themselves causing any damage that would not have occurred anyway. But 
the only reason to do so, short of sheer perversity, is to benefit themselves, or 
third parties about whom they care. No one can reasonably deny that climate 
change threatens millions of people with severe injustice. This injustice arises 
through the industrialised countries’ emissions. Even if these high-emitters 
cause no harm, they greatly benefit. Unjust enrichment obliges beneficiaries 
to disgorge the gains. If wisely used, these resources could do much to fight 
climate change.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE ARGUMENT FROM NO 
DIFFERENCE?
Most discussion of Glover’s seminal essay has focused on what he called ‘the 
argument from the insignificant difference’: that there is no reason to act, or 
refrain from acting, when the effects will be too small to make a difference on 
their own (1975: 172). Philosophers have widely debated whether individuals’ 
carbon emissions are harmful, and, if not, whether they can be wrong. The 
argument from no difference has attracted less attention. Yet it probably plays 
a bigger role in debates about states’ duties to curb their emissions. Whereas 
one cannot plausibly claim that a whole country’s emissions are too small to 
make a difference – at least those of a large one like the United States – it is 
often claimed that reductions in one country will simply cause them to rise 
in another. Let’s call this the Global Warming Argument from No Difference 
(GWAND). What can be said against it? 
Here it will be helpful to consider one of Glover’s examples, originally 
formulated in a famous essay by Bernard Williams (1973: 97–98). George, a 
young chemist, is struggling to get a job, and this is placing severe strain on 
his family. A colleague offers to get him a post in a chemical- and biological-
weapons laboratory. When George says that he opposes these weapons, the 
colleague responds that if George does not take the job, it will go to another, 
less scrupulous researcher, who will likely make more progress in the research 
than George would. George’s wife, who is struggling to support the family, 
has no particular objections to the research. George faces a decision structur-
ally identical with the decision faced by rich emitters, at least to hear the Wall 
Street Journal tell the story. If he takes the job, he will not harm any of the 
victims of chemical weapons, in the sense of making them worse off than they 
would otherwise have been. Indeed, some people will be better off than if the 
other eager-beaver researcher had received the job. Analogously, according to 
extreme versions of GWAND, for the industrialised countries to restrict their 
carbon emissions would actually exacerbate global warming. If George should 
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refuse the job – or the North cut its emissions – the reason cannot be, given 
these assumptions, that the alternative will make things worse.
Even when harm would have occurred anyway, we can criticise an agent 
for inflicting damage, provided that she could not have foreseen that someone 
else would act harmfully in her place. Shooting someone is usually wrong, 
even if it turns out that someone else would have killed the victim. We may 
also blame her if she could have dissuaded other actors from carrying out the 
harmful action (Jackson, 1997). George, however, knows that the other chemist 
will take his place, and nothing he says or does can change that.5 A somewhat 
more cogent objection to his taking the job is that it might prevent him from 
engaging in some other work of value. But George can’t be sure he will get 
any other job, and in any case the objection to the chemical-weapons work can 
hardly rest on the fact that it will stop him from doing the greatest amount of 
good in the world possible. George would also do less good than he possibly 
could if he chose to run a pool hall. If that is the extent of the objection, then 
it is a pretty weak one (Williams, 1973: 100; Glover, 1975: 177–79). In any 
case, this objection applies only to actions with an opportunity cost. Burning 
lots of coal does not prevent countries from doing good things; indeed, it often 
enables them to do so. While it might be better for poor countries to enjoy these 
advantages than the rich ones, this does not seem to get at the central objection 
to the latter’s choice to go on emitting heavily themselves.
A stronger objection to George’s taking the job is that it is likely to discour-
age him from taking a stand against chemical weapons. It may be hard to work 
at a job whose direct effects are death and destruction, even if he knows they 
would occur anyway. George may convince himself that chemical weapons 
are not so bad after all. Nor will he be taken very seriously if he speaks out 
against the chemical-weapons industry (see Glover, 1975: 178). By accepting 
the job, George may also violate what is usually a very good moral rule – don’t 
take jobs that usually harm people. For a number of reasons, agents are likely 
to do better in the long run by following such good principles, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, than by trying to maximise benefits in each case. 
Notably, they must worry that they will be tempted to rationalise self-serving 
decisions as optimal, even in cases where they are not. With some actions, 
such as torture, it may be better not even to consider making exceptions (Hare, 
1965: 43–45; Hare, 1981). While here it has been stipulated that accepting the 
job will make things go best, George himself cannot be sure of that, should be 
mistrustful of his own motives, and might well act rightly – subjectively speak-
ing, at any rate – in turning it down.
5. If this stipulation seems unrealistic, we can add that there are enough unscrupulous chemists 
on the job market that one of them is bound to take George’s place. Analogously, defenders of 
GWAND could argue that if China does not replace the United States’ emissions, then India 
will.
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Moreover, the best moral code is arguably one that agents share, and that 
allows them to monitor each other’s compliance and punish violations. This 
precludes building in too many exceptions, because without extremely de-
tailed knowledge of the circumstances, it would be often hard to tell whether 
agents deserved praise or condemnation (Johnson, 1991: 209–19). Joining a 
chemical-weapons lab is ordinarily a harmful thing to do, or so we have as-
sumed.6 A society with an optimal set of norms will condemn anyone for doing 
so, even though in this case it will make no difference. Indeed, if George is a 
good person who has internalised this code, then he ought to have reservations 
about taking the job. Liam Murphy has made this point well with a different 
example. Suppose your job requires you to wear an expensive suit. One day 
you pass a lake and see a drowning child. You can save the child at the cost of 
ruining your suit, or you can write a cheque to Oxfam that saves two children 
for the sum you would pay to replace it. If you had no reservations at all about 
abandoning the child, consequentialists would rightly conclude that there was 
something badly wrong with you. It would be the sign of a pathological char-
acter; you would have to lack motives highly desirable for agents to have, and 
you could well be blamed for failing to develop them. Perhaps you could justi-
fiably conclude that it was best to write the cheque and let the child drown, but 
you ought at least to feel torn up about the decision (Murphy, 2000: 128–33). 
Similarly, it may be that, all things considered, George should take the job. 
But there would be something wrong with him if he felt that it was the obvious 
thing to do. While Williams considered this a weighty objection to utilitarian-
ism, it can be explained by motive consequentialism (Williams, 1973: 99; see 
also Adams, 1976).
George must worry, then, that the job will corrupt his motives and under-
mine his ability to work for good causes. He should also be suspicious of his 
own motives for violating what is normally a good rule, and his peers will 
rightly have doubts about his decision. Finally, if he has developed the right 
moral reflexes, he should feel reluctance and aversion to the job, even if he 
concludes that it is best to accept. To a greater or lesser extent, all these con-
siderations apply to GWAND. The North has reason to feel reservations – and 
other states have reason to feel some suspicion – about its choosing to violate 
the generally desirable rule against practices that damage other countries. A 
country that has cultivated the right ‘green virtues’ should also feel a visceral 
aversion to polluting (Jamieson, 2007). Most importantly, staying hooked on 
fossil fuels risks corrupting the industrialised countries’ motives, and discour-
aging them from pursuing alternatives (Gardiner, 2011). Nor will they be able 
to demand sacrifices from other states as credibly as they otherwise would. The 
danger that ongoing high emissions will undermine Northern states’ ability to 
work for change – assuming, of course, that they have any interest in doing so 
6. In contrast to biological weapons, it is not obvious that chemical weapons—which is presum-
ably what George would be working on—are worse than conventional ones. See Price, 1997.
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– is actually greater than in George’s case. George might, after all, have little 
influence (Williams, 1973: 107; Glover, 1975: 179). The same cannot be said 
of the United States. 
Nevertheless, let us stipulate that if George takes the job, or if the indus-
trialised countries go on polluting, they will do less harm than if others took 
their place. Under these circumstances, refusing might seem self-indulgent 
(Silverstein, 1979: 350–58). George’s wife, who is struggling to keep the 
family above water, may have little sympathy with his scruples. Voters in in-
dustrialised countries are apt to have very little time for the claim that they 
must sacrifice jobs and living standards, unless worldwide emissions will actu-
ally go down. Finally, if industry simply migrates, those states that exercise 
restraint are apt to lose resources and power to states with fewer environmental 
scruples. In a tragedy of the commons, appeals to voluntary self-restraint risk 
undermining the very attitudes we seek to promote, by increasing the influence 
of actors unresponsive to the norm (Hardin, 1968/2009: 249–50).
All things considered, given the stipulated assumptions, George might de-
fensibly accept the job, and the North might maintain its emissions. But the 
story does not end there. The argument from no difference has a feature its 
analysts have hitherto overlooked: unjust enrichment. If George takes the job, 
or if the industrialised countries go on emitting, then they will profit from an 
injustice, and they will act wrongly if they keep all of the gains.
III. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Beneficiaries of unjust enrichment do not always cause the original injustice. 
Nevertheless, they act wrongly by retaining the gains. Agents can be blamed if 
they are aware – or should have been aware – that they have benefited unjustly, 
and if they could disgorge the benefits, but fail to do so (Brooks, 1989: 36; 
Anwander, 2005: 42). If he takes the chemical-weapons job, George will earn 
a good salary. True, if he did not do the work, someone else would. ‘How can 
George benefit at the victims’ expense’, it might be asked, ‘when they would 
have suffered the same harm if he had refused the job?’7 Even if we grant that 
George will not benefit at their expense, benefits will be unjustly produced at 
their expense – benefits of which he will be the recipient. Similarly, Northern 
states are using far more than their fair share of carbon emissions, by any 
reasonable standard. This process entails, in Steve Vanderheiden’s words, ‘the 
shifting of the ecological costs of the high-consumption lifestyle of the world’s 
affluent onto those who can least afford to bear them, are least responsible for 
7. Harry Silverstein argues that in such cases the agent is not even causally responsible: ‘since 
nothing he can do will prevent it, he does not cause it’ (1979: 355). Carolina Sartorio, in con-
trast, maintains that when one agent’s action pre-empts another’s, the first remains causally 
responsible (2006: 531). 
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producing them, and have received the least advantage from them’. It means 
unjust enrichment (Vanderheiden, 2008: 45–46, quotation at 45; Page, 2012).
Unjust enrichment is related to another form of injustice: exploitation. 
Both can occur without making the victims worse off: they are often, in Joel 
Feinberg’s felicitous phrase, forms of ‘harmless wrongdoing’ (see Feinberg, 
1988). Indeed, workers typically benefit from being exploited; otherwise, they 
would not accept the job. The real objection is not that exploitation harms 
them, but that they do not benefit as much as they deserve (Mayer, 2007: 141; 
see also Feinberg, 1988: 176). Yet most consequentialists will agree that both 
unjust enrichment and exploitation, other things being equal, make outcomes 
worse. Some will hold that they introduce independent elements of badness, 
whereas others will see them as reducing the moral value of utility that would 
be worth more if fairly distributed (see Feldman, 1995a; Feldman, 1995b; 
Vallentyne, 1995). Consequentialists can object to George’s taking the job, or 
to industrialised states’ high emissions, on the ground not that they are harm-
ful, but that they are unfair.
Note that unfairness arises in these cases through actions occurring in the 
present. Some climate philosophers have sought to base the charge of unjust 
enrichment on industrialised states’ excessive past emissions (Gosseries, 2004; 
Page, 2012). This claim, when applied to the distant past, seems to fall foul of 
the ‘non-identity problem’. Decisions about energy have an effect upon which 
people are born. If our ancestors had not mined coal and burned oil, hardly 
any of us would be here; they would have met and mated with different people 
and at different times, and genetically-different people would have been born 
instead of us. This makes it hard to argue that the present-day inhabitants of 
the North are better off than they would otherwise be because of emissions that 
occurred before they were born. Had those emissions not occurred, they would 
not be worse off; rather, they would not exist at all (Caney, 2006: 475-76; com-
pare Das, 2014). Nevertheless, because of the world’s current high emissions, 
today’s rich countries enjoy more resources and welfare than they deserve, 
and future people will receive less. And for purposes of making that claim, the 
latter’s identity is irrelevant. If I take more than my fair share of pie, leaving 
the next person who comes to the table with less, then I act unfairly even if my 
act results in a different person having pie. My act does not change my identity, 
and we can still say I have benefited unjustly. Analogously, even if present 
emissions will not harm our descendants in the sense of making them worse 
off than they would otherwise be, consequentialists can condemn the current 
unjust enrichment of the industrialised countries at their expense. The expected 
outcome is thus worse than if the same quantity of utility were distributed as 
it should be (Rendall, 2011b: 244–45; Lawford-Smith, 2014). In fact, a strong 
case can also be made that the inhabitants of the industrialised countries have 
benefited, and continue to benefit excessively from these emissions ever since 
each of them was born (Meyer and Roser, 2010: 234-35; Page, 2012: 320). 
Guest User = username
$REMOTE_ASSR = IP address
Tue, 20 Oct 2015 21:07:47 = Date & Time
CARBON LEAKAGE AND THE ARGUMENT FROM NO DIFFERENCE
543
Environmental Values 24.4
Nevertheless, the benefits from their present emissions are quite enough to 
ground a claim of unjust enrichment.
None of this proves that George should refuse the job, or that the industri-
alised countries should slash their emissions. If carbon leakage will be severe, 
then slashing emissions will not prevent the injustice – it will mean that other 
agents scoop the gains instead. The mistake of the argument from no differ-
ence is a different one – to assume that this justifies performing the action and 
keeping all the gains. In fact, if one cannot prevent unjust enrichment, the next 
best thing is to rectify it. This often means compensating the victims. George 
could donate part of the salary from his new job to a fund for the victims of 
chemical weapons. Likewise, it may do more good for the North to continue its 
high-emitting activities, but use part of the profits to assist victims of climate 
change with adaptation. Nobody, however, has yet been killed by George’s 
research, and most of the damage from climate change is yet to come (Posner 
and Weisbach, 2010: 108). George has a means of reducing the chance that 
people will be harmed at all: he can use his earnings to lobby against chemical 
warfare. Rectification sometimes involves using the unjust gains to put an end 
to the injustice (Brooks, 1989: 41–42). Similarly, the best way to help prospec-
tive victims of climate change may be to see that less of it occurs in the first 
place. That includes assistance to poorer states in reducing their emissions, 
and research into alternative energy sources. It could also mean side-payments 
to industrialising countries to gain their accession to a cap and trade regime. 
IV. DOES THE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT MAKE SENSE?
In an important new paper (2015), Robert Huseby criticises the view that 
the beneficiaries of unjust enrichment bear a special duty to compensate the 
victims of the act from which they benefited. Suppose that climate change re-
sulting from the emissions of the industrialised countries causes droughts, crop 
failures and famine in the Sahel. Imagine that at the same time, an unprovoked 
invasion of Congo by its neighbours causes crop failures and famine there. 
People are starving in both regions through no fault of their own. Congo’s 
neighbours, moreover, are neither able nor willing to relieve the famine, nor 
is there any prospect of their doing so in the future. Suppose, finally, that by 
assisting Congo, the rich countries could save more lives. If agents must com-
pensate the victims of acts from which they have unjustly profited, then the 
rich countries should give priority to the Sahel. This may seem implausible.
Huseby notes that when an agent has caused harm, it might be held that she 
has an obligation to compensate that act’s specific victim. But that is not the 
case here; we are assuming that if the industrialised countries had not done the 
emitting, China would have done so in their place. The rich countries ought to 
make compensation, not because they have harmed the Sahel, but because they 
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are enjoying more than their fair share of benefits. The rationale for compensa-
tion is thus to rectify a distributive injustice. But surely if one innocent person 
starves in Congo, it is just as unjust as if one person starves in the Sahel. Why 
should the Sahel have a stronger claim to be compensated simply because the 
beneficiary of the acts which caused the damage happens to be able and willing 
to pay compensation? (Huseby, 2015: 218–20). Assisting the Congo would 
save more lives, and also redress more injustice.
This objection could be met by broadening the principle to hold that 
‘beneficiaries from unjust acts have special duties to compensate any victim 
of injustice’ – what Huseby refers to as the ‘Generalized Beneficiary Pays 
Principle’, or GBPP. We could then conclude that insofar as the industrialised 
countries have benefited unjustly from carbon emissions, they may use this 
surplus to relieve injustice in either the Sahel or Congo. Suppose next, how-
ever, that an earthquake strikes Ethiopia, again resulting in crop failure and 
starvation. The GBPP, Huseby argues, has the implausible implication that in 
such cases the beneficiaries of injustice have more reason to help the victims 
of human injustice than of natural disasters (2015: 221). It would tell them to 
assist Congo rather than Ethiopia, even if they could do more for the latter, and 
this despite the fact that they were responsible for neither country’s suffering. 
This implication is certainly implausible, but we need not abandon the con-
cept of unjust enrichment, or the principle of disgorgement. Rather, we should 
accept that suffering a natural disaster can be a form of injustice. Robinson 
Crusoe may have suffered no injustice through being shipwrecked. But the 
plight of the Ethiopians is not like that: if nobody helps them, they will be 
avoidably worse off through no fault of their own. When industrial countries 
emit more than they would be allowed if all states were doing their share, 
their residents enjoy more than their fair share of welfare. The inhabitants of 
all three regions in our story enjoy less. Justice is often equated with fairness; 
fairness requires the satisfaction of claims according to their strength (Broome, 
1990/91: 95). Starving people in all three regions have equal claims on the rich 
countries’ assistance, insofar as they are equally badly off through no fault of 
their own, the rich countries are better off than they deserve to be, and the latter 
could redress the imbalance. The most that Huseby’s critique shows, then, is 
that the North might also make up for its unjust enrichment by assisting other 
innocent victims.8 
8. A number of writers, most recently John Broome (2012: 13–14, 66–67), have maintained that 
for those concerned with maximising value, there are options more cost-effective than carbon 
mitigation. Since runaway climate change might result in the permanent impoverishment of 
the planet, this argument is plausible only if we greatly discount the future. Particularly if 
we give significant weight to the existence of higher forms of sentient life in the far future, 
reducing the small risk of the extinction or the collapse of these populations has enormous 
expected value, as Broome’s own comments in an earlier essay suggest (2010: 108–10; see 
also Kent, 2004: 164). While the North might make up for its unjust emissions by investing 
in other projects, carbon mitigation is one of its best options.
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One might think that this stretches the concept of unjust enrichment to the 
breaking-point. Why not just say that Northern states owe assistance because 
of the harm they are causing as polluters, or because of their ability to pay 
(Huseby, 2015)? The polluter-pays principle presupposes that the polluter must 
make compensation in proportion to the harm it has caused (Vanderheiden, 
2008: 67). If carbon leakage would be extensive, however, much of the North’s 
present emissions do not cause harm in the sense of making global warming 
worse than it would otherwise be. To base the North’s duty of assistance solely 
on its ability to pay, on the other hand, would entail that even if some rich 
countries chose to go on emitting at high levels, they would have no greater 
duty to offer mitigation and adaptation assistance than would equally well-off 
states with low emissions. But that seems unfair. Even if it were fair, it would 
be undesirable for practical reasons, since it would give high-emitting states 
no incentive to reduce their emissions (Gesang, 2011: 59). The latter have an 
additional responsibility to discharge, which neither the harm that they cause 
nor their ability to pay seems fully to explain. There appears to be a distinct 
role for the GBPP, after all.
Some might object that assigning greater responsibility to rich high-emit-
ters is nevertheless unjustified. If an act is permissible, then on what has been 
called the ‘nonworseness claim’, any alternative is permissible if it has at least 
as good an outcome (Wertheimer, 1996: 289–93). Few would hold that George 
is obliged to take the chemical-weapons job. Similarly, it may seem that if a 
country slashes its own emissions, it has done enough, even if the emissions 
migrate elsewhere. Yet if George takes the job and spends his whole salary 
on himself and his family, or if a rich Northern country goes on emitting and 
does nothing to offset the consequences, the consequences will be no worse, 
we have stipulated, than those of either of these permissible acts. The agents of 
the harm and the beneficiaries of the enrichment will change, but that should 
be irrelevant for impartial consequentialists. Why should one set of actions be 
permissible, but not the others?
We can start to address this objection by asking why consequentialists 
might think that George could permissibly turn down the job. Those who be-
lieve that agents must always seek to maximise the good will simply deny 
that he might (Bailey, 2011: 241–42). George would do more good by taking 
the job and donating a large share of his salary to some worthy end. Moderate 
consequentialists, however, hold that people may sometimes give their own 
goals and interests priority. One justification is that granting this permission 
makes things go best in the long run. If all of us were obliged to choose our 
jobs, marry or refuse to marry, spend each penny of our salaries, and so on, 
on the basis of what would maximise happiness in the universe, we would be 
very unhappy indeed. That is, in fact, one of the points Williams was mak-
ing with George’s example (1973: 112–13, 131). There is a reason, then – a 
consequentialist reason – to leave people morally free to turn down jobs, even 
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when they could do more good by taking the job and giving much or most of 
the earnings away. No comparably strong justification exists for leaving them 
free to practise harmful occupations but to retain the salary. The world will 
not be a better place if we permit people to make money from noxious jobs 
without disgorging the profits. Analogously, there is a strong reason to allow 
societies to shape their own ways of life. To demand that each should build its 
entire economy around whatever would internationally maximise utility would 
be almost as oppressive as to demand it of individuals. The same is not true of 
allowing states to retain benefits unjustly produced at other countries’ expense.
Beneficiaries of unjust enrichment, then, ought to disgorge the gains. One 
might think that this would require George to give up his whole salary. After 
all, every bit of it comes from work that harms people. Most of us, however, 
think that George could defensibly refuse the job. If he were required to sur-
render his entire salary, he surely would refuse. The consequences would be 
worse, both because the other chemist would pursue the work more assidu-
ously, and because the latter would disgorge none of his gains at all. The moral 
code with the best results, then, will require agents to surrender gains from 
unjust enrichment, but allow them to retain enough that they do not lose out, 
or even are modestly better off, in comparison with their next-best permis-
sible option.9 It is widely agreed that in cases of unjust enrichment, one must 
disgorge only up to the point that one is no longer benefiting (Butt, 2007: 
142; Page, 2012: 309–10).10 High-emitting countries ought to give up their 
gains until they are as well-off, or modestly better-off, than they would be 
if their emissions matched their fair international share (see Lawford-Smith, 
2014). Given the large emissions-cuts that industrialised countries would have 
to make under any fair and effective international climate regime, no precise 
calculations are needed to see that states which go on emitting at high levels 
ought to give up far more than they are presently doing.
Such large sums could make a tremendous difference. Given enough side-
payments by the industrialised countries, a worldwide agreement to limit 
emissions might succeed. Southern countries have shown openness to such an 
agreement, provided that they benefit enough. Under a cap, if the North wished 
to maintain a high level of emissions, this would require it to transfer substan-
tial sums through carbon trading (Davidson, 2008: 78). The North could also 
9. It is true that when one agent harms another, she may be obliged to make compensation even 
when it leaves her worse off. George, however, will not harm the victims of chemical weap-
ons if he takes the job; indeed, he will leave some prospective victims better off than they 
would be if he refused. His obligation to disgorge arises from unjust enrichment.
10. This implies that if the job were poorly paid enough, George would have no obligation to 
disgorge any of his gains. This may seem hard to believe. But if the pay were so poor to make 
the job no better than being unemployed, then we would wonder why he was taking the job 
at all. Indeed, other considerations – the presumption against going into harmful professions, 
the risk that it would corrupt him or make it harder to speak out against chemical weapons – 
would give grounds to turn it down.
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encourage compliance by funding mitigation and adaptation – including affor-
estation and renewable energy – in the developing world. The North should 
pay for mitigation, but much of the money should be spent in the South (see 
Hohl and Roser, 2011: 497).11 Breakthroughs in alternative energy could make 
it in states’ direct economic interest to cut emissions (Shue 2013: 396-99).12 
Yet worldwide government spending on energy R&D has actually fallen since 
the 1970s (Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke, Jr., 2008; Fölster 
and Nyström, 2010: 233). There is still time to make amends. David King and 
Richard Layard (2013), for example, have recently argued for a push to de-
velop solar energy, with the targets of making its cost competitive with that of 
fossil fuels, and supplying twenty-five per cent of total worldwide energy use 
by 2030. A mere fraction of the wealth that the North derives from its excessive 
emissions would fund much research indeed.
V. IS DISGORGEMENT REALISTIC?
Demands for disgorgement on this scale may seem unrealistic. ‘We can’t wait 
to hear Mr Obama tell Americans that he wants them to pay higher taxes’, 
scoffs the Wall Street Journal, ‘so the U.S. can pay China to become more 
energy efficient and thus more economically competitive’ (2009b). In fact, 
this is hardly absurd: any international agreement on climate change will need 
China’s participation, and side payments to get Beijing on board might be an 
efficient way for Washington to discharge its obligations (Gesang, 2011: 199–
200). But understood as a claim about political realities, the argument has a 
point. Eric Posner and David Weisbach have recently argued that any viable 
international climate agreement must leave all parties roughly as well off as 
they would be in its absence (2010: 179). If so, then this would preclude redis-
tribution from the rich countries on the scale that justice demands. 
Their diagnosis may, however, be too pessimistic: it overlooks the possibil-
ity of financing a significant share of the mitigation through intergenerational 
11. In a Wall Street Journal op-ed during the Copenhagen climate conference, Richard Muller 
(2009) suggested that the West might ‘subsidize CCS [carbon capture and storage] in China 
or pay to make its plants CCS ready’ and ‘[t]he bulk of our effort is best directed at helping 
the emerging economies conserve energy and move rapidly toward efficient solar, wind and 
nuclear power’. He then maintained that ‘make-the-West-bear-the-burden Copenhagen pro-
posals are meaningless’. Why?
12. ‘[E]ven if a fantastic renewable energy technology enters the market in the United States’, 
Benjamin Hale warns, ‘this does not give places like Argentina or Saudi Arabia a reason 
to stop pumping oil. It only increases their incentives to pump until all extractable oil is 
consumed’ (2011: 380). But nothing would prevent Northern states from transferring that 
technology to the South, provided it was developed with public funds. Even if one doubts that 
the North would actually do this, if cost-effective alternative energy became widespread and 
mass-produced in the United States or Europe, it is hard to believe it would not soon spread 
to China or India, as Bernward Gesang points out (2011: 212–14).
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transfers (Foley, 2007; Rendall, 2011a; Broome, 2012: 43–48, 154–55; 
Rozenberg et al., 2013; Caney, 2014: 332–38). This could mean increasing 
the public debt, decreasing public and private investment in other sectors, or 
increased use of natural resources – in each case, shifting part of the burden to 
future generations in the rich countries (Broome, 2012: 44-45; Zelenak, 2009: 
1361). Some will think that this would right an international injustice at the 
expense of creating an intergenerational one. John Broome, who favours such 
a policy on pragmatic grounds, nonetheless laments that ‘emitters are paid to 
reduce their emissions by the receivers [of harm]….Receivers in effect bribe 
emitters not to harm them’ (2012: 46). Yet running up debt at the expense of fu-
ture generations cannot harm them at all, because of the non-identity problem. 
The relevant questions are not whether it will cause harm, but whether doing 
so will cause a loss in total utility, and whether it is unfair.
Because marginal utility from income declines as people get richer, taking 
resources from future rich people to protect future poor people from climate 
change should increase total welfare (see Gesang, 2011: 189-90, 198-99). 
Provided that we avert disaster, the rich countries are also likely to be much 
richer in the future than they are at present, regardless of whether we pass on 
some of the costs of mitigation (Rendall, 2011a).13 Furthermore, part of the 
stock of emissions that threatens future people arose from the actions of our 
ancestors. It is not the present generation’s fault that the need to slash car-
bon emissions comes during our watch (Malnes, 1995: 108). Why should we 
bear the entire burden of the transition to a low-carbon economy – a transition 
which will mainly benefit our descendants? It is only fair that the rich of the 
future should share the load – just as it is also only fair to future people to en-
sure that enough mitigation takes place. Shifting part of the cost to the future 
may render mitigation more politically feasible (Rendall, 2011a: 893; Broome, 
2012: 47–48; Rozenberg et al., 2013).
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change is likely to kill millions of humans, and still more non-hu-
mans. It may kill orders of magnitude more (Broome, 2010: 106–9; Weitzman, 
2011). By any standard, this is an appalling injustice. Yet if carbon leakage 
should prove as severe as critics of the Kyoto process suggest, then Northern-
emissions curbs will be exploited by industrialising countries, while doing 
little good. The mistake of GWAND’s proponents is to assume that this gets 
13. Opponents of strong mitigation policies sometimes invoke this consideration as a reason for 
doing little about climate change. Thus Bjørn Lomborg argues that it would be more efficient 
to spend the same money on helping poor people in the South today (2007: 55). This ignores 
both harm to non-humans, and the low-probability but nonetheless serious risk that runaway 
global warming will leave the future impoverished instead.
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the high-emitters off the hook. Business as usual is not a defensible option. 
Even if the North does not make up for all its unjust enrichment, giving up just 
a fraction would amount to far more than it has done so far (see Page, 2012: 
325–27). For too long, critics of carbon mitigation have got away with claim-
ing that carbon leakage justifies business as usual. That is not the case. The 
North may be justified in maintaining high emissions. But so long as it refuses 
to disgorge the profits, it is retaining goods which belong to others. 
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